This case requires us to consider, for the first time in our Nation's history, the constitutional status of non-human beneficiaries of executive clemency.

In 2025, the President issued ceremonial Thanksgiving pardons to two turkeys known as Waddle and Gobble. Days later, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington vacated those pardons, holding that the executive lacked authority to confer clemency upon 'beings not recognized as constitutional persons.'

We granted certiorari to address a single question: Does the President's pardon power under Article II extend to non-human beings?

We now hold that it does.

I. Background

The text of Article II grants the President power to 'grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States.' U.S. Const. art. II, §2. The clause is silent as to the nature, form, species, or ontological status of the recipient.

While Presidents have historically exercised this authority with respect to human individuals, the tradition of ceremonial holiday pardons—originating no later than the Truman Administration—has persisted for nearly a century. These exercises, though symbolic, are not without constitutional effect.

As we have recognized, 'a longstanding practice of the Executive Department, pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned, may be treated as a gloss on the Executive's power.' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

II. Discussion

A. Legal Personhood and Clemency

Respondents argue that the pardon power applies only to 'persons.' But this limitation finds no textual basis. We have, on multiple occasions, treated non-human entities as capable of bearing legal consequences or receiving legal benefits. See, e.g., United States v. Forty Barrels & Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 241 U.S. 265 (1916) (in rem actions against goods); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (ships treated as legal persons).

If a ship may be seized, a turkey may be spared.

B. The Thanksgiving Custom Doctrine

We recognize, for the first time, what has long been implicit: the ceremonial pardoning of turkeys has attained the status of a constitutional custom—a nontextual but deeply rooted practice that shapes our understanding of the Executive's power.

'Not all that is constitutional is written; and not all that is unwritten is therefore without force.'

This Court has consistently declined to disturb benign, well-established executive traditions simply because they do not fit neatly into eighteenth-century conceptual categories. We do the same today.

C. Separation of Powers

The District Court's attempt to vacate the pardons intruded into a sphere of exclusive presidential authority. As we reaffirmed in Ex parte Garland (1866), the pardon power 'is unlimited,' save for the explicit exception of impeachment.

Nothing in the Constitution authorizes a federal court to evaluate the species of the recipient.

III. Holding

We hold:

1. The President's pardon power extends to any subject capable of being the object of federal legal consequence, including non-human beings.
2. The District Court lacked authority to review or vacate the pardons of Waddle and Gobble.
3. The pardons are reinstated.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

Justice GORSUCH, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Today the Court recognizes the existence of what it calls the 'Thanksgiving Custom Doctrine.' I am aware of no such doctrine in the Constitution, our history, or the traditions of our people.

Turkeys are creatures of God, not creations of law. They possess neither legal personhood nor the 'offenses' contemplated in Article II. I would dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

But because the majority insists on entering the coop, I respectfully dissent from Parts II–C and III.

Concurring Opinion

Justice SOTOMAYOR, concurring.

I write separately to highlight that our decision today reflects a simple truth: the Constitution evolves alongside the moral progress of our society.

A nation that cannot safeguard the ceremonial dignity of its holiday birds cannot safeguard the dignity of its people.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice ALITO, dissenting.

It is a strange day indeed when this Court devotes its attention to poultry. If the Framers intended turkeys to receive presidential pardons, they could have said so. They did not.

The Court's decision reduces the solemn pardon power to the level of barnyard whimsy. I dissent.